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Abstract. We introduce a new technique for extracting unique ﬁnger-
prints from identical CDs. The proposed technique takes advantage of
manufacturing variability found in the length of the CD lands and pits.
Although the variability measured is on the order of 20 nm, the technique
does not require the use of microscopes or any advanced equipment. In-
stead, we show that the electrical signal produced by the photodetector
inside the CD reader is suﬃcient to measure the desired variability. We
investigate the new technique by analyzing data collected from 100 iden-
tical CDs and show how to extract a unique ﬁngerprint for each CD.
Furthermore, we introduce a technique for utilizing fuzzy extractors over
the Lee metric without much change to the standard code oﬀset construc-
tion. Finally, we identify speciﬁc parameters and a code construction to
realize the proposed fuzzy extractor and convert the derived ﬁngerprints
into 128-bit cryptographic keys.
Keywords: Optical discs, ﬁngerprinting, device identiﬁcation, fuzzy
extractor.
1 Introduction
According to the Business Software Alliance about 35% of the global software
market, worth $141 Billion, is counterfeit. Most of the counterfeit software is dis-
tributed in the form of a compact disc (CD) or a digital video disc (DVD) which
is easily copied and sold in street corners all around the world but mostly in de-
veloping countries. Given the severity of the problem at hand, a comprehensive
solution taking into account the manufacturing process, economical implications,
ease of enforcement, and the owner’s rights, needs to be developed. While this
is an enourmous undertaking requiring new schemes at all levels of implemen-
tation, in this work, we focus only on a small part of the problem, i.e. secure
ﬁngerprinting techniques for optical media.
To address this problem the SecuRom technology was introduced by Sony
DADC. The technology links the identiﬁers produced to executable ﬁles which
may only be accessed when the CD is placed in the reader. The main advantage of
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this technology is that it can be used with existing CD readers and writers. While
the speciﬁcs of the scheme are not disclosed, in practice, the technology seems to
be too fragile, i.e. slightly overused CDs become unidentiﬁable. Another problem
is at the protocol level. The digital rights management (DRM) is enforced too
harshly, therefore signiﬁcantly curtailing the rights of the CD owner.
In this paper we take advantage of CD manufacturing variability in order to
generate unique CD ﬁngerprints. The approach of using manufacturing variabil-
ity to ﬁngerprint a device or to build cryptographic primitives has been applied
in several contextes. A popular example is a new hardware primitives called
Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs). These primitives were proposed for
tamper-detection at the physical level by exploiting deep-submicron and nano-
scale physical phenomena to build low-cost tamper-evident key storage devices
[7,8,6,12]. PUFs are based on the subtleties of the operating conditions as well
as random variations that are imprinted into an integrated circuit during the
manufacturing process. This phenomenon, i.e., manufacturing variability, creates
minute diﬀerences in circuit parameters, e.g., capacitances, line delays, threshold
voltages etc., in chips which otherwise were manufactured to be logically identi-
cal. Therefore, it becomes possible to use manufacturing variability to uniquely
ﬁngerprint circuits. More recently, another circuit ﬁngerprinting technique was
introduced. The technique exploits manufacturing variability in integrated chips
to detect Trojan circuits inserted during the manufacturing process [5].
Another secure ﬁngerprinting technology named RF-DNA was developed by
Microsoft Research [1]. The RF-DNA technology provides unique and unclon-
able physical ﬁngerprints based on the subtleties of the interaction of devices
when subjected to an electromagnetic wave. The ﬁngerprints are used to pro-
duce a cryptographic certiﬁcate of authenticity (COA) which when associated
with a high value good may be used to verify the authenticity of the good and to
distinguish it from counterfeit goods. Another application of manufacturing vari-
ability is ﬁngerprinting paper objects. In [4] the authors propose Laser Surface
Authentication which uses a high resolution laser microscope to capture the im-
age texture from which the ﬁngerprint is developed. In a more recent proposal, a
cheap commodity scanner was used to identify paper documents [3]. While most
of the results cited above were developed in the last decade, the idea of using
physical ﬁngerprints to obtain security primitives is not new at all. According
to [1], access cards based on physical unclonable properties of media have been
proposed decades ago by Bauder in a Sandia National Labs technical report [2].
Our Contribution: We introduce a method which exploits CD manufactur-
ing variability to generate unique ﬁngerprints from logically identical CDs. The
biggest advantage of our approach is that it uses the electrical signal gener-
ated by the photodiode of a CD reader. Thus no expensive scanning or imaging
equipment of the CD surface is needed. This means that regular CD readers can
implement the proposed method with minimal change to their design. We inves-
tigate the new approach with a study of over 100 identical CDs. Furthermore,
we introduce a new technique, called the threshold scheme, for utilizing fuzzy
extractors over the Lee metric without much change to the standard code oﬀset
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construction [10]. The threshold scheme allows us to use error correcting codes
working under the Hamming metric for samples which are close under the Lee
metric. The threshold scheme is not restricted to CDs, and therefore can serve
in any noisy ﬁngerprinting application where the Lee metric is relevant. With
the aid of the proposed fuzzy extractor we give speciﬁc parameters and a code
construction to convert the derived ﬁngerprints into 128-bit cryptographic keys.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the
physical aspects of CD storage, the sources of manufacturing variability and the
statisticalmodel capturing theCDvariability. Section3presents experimental data
to verify our statistical model. In Section 4 we discuss the ﬁngerprint extraction
technique and determine the parameters necessary for key generation. We discuss
the robustness of the ﬁngerprint in Section 5 and ﬁnally conclude in Section 6.
2 Pits and Lands
On a typical CD data is stored as a series of lands and pits formed on the surface
of the CD. The pits are bumps separated by the lands to form a spiral track on
the surface of the CD. The spiral track starts from the center of the CD and
spirals outward. It has a width of about 0.5 μm and a 1.6 μm separation. The
length of the land or pit determines the stored data. The encoding length can
assume only one of nine lengths with minimum value in the range 833 to 972 nm
up to a maximum of 3054 to 3563 nm with increments ranging from 278 to 324
nm. Note that the range is dependent on the speed used while writing the CD.
To read the data on the CD the reader shines a laser on the surface of the CD
and collects the reﬂected beam. When the laser hits the pits it will reﬂect in a
diﬀused fashion thus appearing relatively dark compared to the lands. Upon the
collection of the reﬂected beam, the reader can deduce the location and length
of the lands and pits which results in reading the data on the CD.
CDs are written in two ways, pressing and burning. In pressed CDs a master
template is formed with lands and pits corresponding to the data. The master
template is then pressed into blank CDs in order to form a large number of
copies. In burned CDs, the writing laser heats the dye layer on the CD-R to a
Fig. 1. Lands and pits image using an
optical microscope
Fig. 2. Lands and pits image using a scan-
ning electron microscope
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point where it turns dark, thus reﬂecting the reading laser in a manner consistent
with physical lands. Note that burned CDs will not have physical lands and pits
but will act as if they had these features. Figures 1 and 2 show the lands and
pits of a pressed CD. We captured Figure 1 using an optical microscope and
Figure 2 using a scanning electron microscope.
2.1 Source of Variation
Similar to any physical process, during the writing process CDs will undergo
manufacturing variation which will directly aﬀect the length of the lands and
pits. For burned CDs this variability will be a direct result of the CD velocity
while writing takes place. This velocity is assumed to be at a ﬁxed rate between
1.2 and 1.4 m/s where the velocity variation during writing should be within
±0.01m/s [11]. Pressed CDs are manufactured by molding thermoplastics from a
micro or nanostructured master prepared by lithographic methods. The molding
process itself is optimized for replication ﬁdelity and speed with typical repli-
cation variations on the order of tens of nanometers [17]. The molding process
involves contacting the thermoplastic with the master slightly above the glass
transition temperature of the material, with a preset pressure for a brief amount
of time, cooling the master and the thermoplastic to below the glass transition
temperature and demoulding. Local variations of polymer material’s mechani-
cal and thermal properties, local variations of the temperature and pressure all
potentially lead to variations in the imprinted structures. The thermal stresses
induced during cooling and demoulding also potentially lead to variations. In this
paper we aim at using the small variation in the length of lands and pits in order
to form a unique ﬁngerprint for each CD. In the next section we characterize the
length features of lands and pits.
2.2 Single Location Characterization
Together lands and pits form the full spiral track. Therefore, it makes sense
to ﬁngerprint only lands or pits. The length of both lands and pits will fol-
low similar distributions which is why we will simply use the term location to
refer to either of them. We label the lengths of n consecutive locations by start-
ing from a reference point on the track, as L1, L2, . . . , Ln. In the ideal setting
Li = ci · L for a small constant integer ci ∈ [3, 4, . . . , 11] and L ≈ 300 nm.
However, due to the subtle variations we discussed in the previous section we
expect Li = ci ·L+ i. The variable i is expected to be quite small compared to
Li, and therefore diﬃcult to measure precisely. Still our measurements should
be centered around the ideal length. Hence, quite naturally across all identical
CDs we model Li as a random variable drawn from a Gaussian distribution
Hi = N(Mi, Σ) where Mi = ci · L and Σ denotes the mean and the standard
deviation respectively1.
1 N(μ, σ) is a normal distribution with mean μ and standard deviation σ.
352 G. Hammouri, A. Dana, and B. Sunar
Here we are assuming that regardless of the location, the standard deviation
Σ will be the same. This is a quite a realistic assumption since Σ essentially
captures the manufacturing variability which should aﬀect all locations similarly.
The more precise the manufacturing process is, the less of a standard deviation
we would expect Hi to have. A perfect manufacturing process would yield Σ = 0
and would therefore give all CDs the same exact length of a speciﬁc location
across all identical CDs. On the other hand, for better identiﬁcation of CDs we
would like Hi to have a relatively large Σ.
In a typical CD reader, the reading laser is reﬂected from the CD surface
back into a photodiode which generates an electrical signal that depends on
the intensity of the reﬂected laser. Therefore, the electrical signal is expected
to depict the shape of the CD surface. If these electrical signals are used to
measure the length of any given location, we expect these measurements to have
a certain level of noise following a Gaussian distribution. So for location i on
CDj we denote this distribution by Dij = N(μij , σ). The noise in the length
measurements is captured through the standard deviation σ. Since this quantity
mainly depends on the readers noise, we assume that its the same for all CDs
and all CD locations. Contrary to Σ, to identify diﬀerent CDs using the length
information of CD locations we would like to see a relatively small σ.
3 Experimental Validation
To validate the statistical model outlined in the previous section, we conducted
extensive experiments on a number of CDs. We directly probed into the electri-
cal signal coming out of the photodiode constellation inside the CD reader. The
intensity of this signal will reﬂect the CD surface geometry, and therefore can be
used to study the length of the CD locations. To sample the waveform we used
a 20 GHz oscilloscope. Each CD was read a number of times in order to get an
idea of the actual D distribution. Similarly, we read from the same locations of
about 100 identical CDs in order to generate the H distribution. Each collected
trace required about 100 MBytes of storage space. Moreover, synchronizing the
diﬀerent traces to make sure that the data was captured from the same location
of the CD was quite a challenge. We had to assign a master trace which repre-
sented the locations we were interested in studying and then ran the other traces
through multiple correlation stages with the master to ﬁnally extract synchro-
nized signals from the same locations on diﬀerent CDs. Automating the process
in order to accurately capture this massive amount of data was a time consuming
challenge. However, we note that all this work would be almost trivially elimi-
nated if we had access to the internal synchronization signals of the CD reader
chip. The captured signals were then further processed using Matlab to extract
the location lengths and obtain the distributions. After processing, we extracted
the length of 500 locations (lands) on the CDs. We used commercially pressed
CDs for all the experiments reported in this paper.2
2 We have veriﬁed a similar behavior for burned CDs. Not surprisingly, data coming
from burned CDs had a much larger variation and was easier to analyze.
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Figure 3 shows the histogram of lengths extracted from 550 reads for a ran-
domly chosen location on one CD. The mean length of the histogram is about
μij = 958 nm. This histogram captures the D distribution. The other locations
observe similar distributions with diﬀerent mean lengths which will depend on
the encoded information. When considering data coming from diﬀerent locations
and diﬀerent CDs we obtain σ = 20 nm (with an average standard deviation of
2 nm on σ). This will be a good estimate for the noise observed during prob-
ing of the electrical signals. These results verify the assumption that the noise
in the electrical signal can be approximated as Gaussian noise. Note that with
Gaussian noise simple averaging can be used to substantially reduce the noise
level. As we are interested in studying the behavior of the location lengths across
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Fig. 3. Histogram of reads coming from
the same location on the same CD
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Fig. 4. Histograms of reads coming from
the same location on two identical CDs
diﬀerent CDs, we next shift our attention to two CDs before we look at a larger
batch of CDs. Figure 4 captures a histogram for the length of the same location
on two identical CDs. What is important here is the distance between the two
Gaussians. The larger this distance becomes the easier it is to identify CDs.
Our basic thesis for ﬁngerprinting CDs is that the length of a single location
will vary across multiple identical CDs. As pointed out earlier, this behavior
can be modeled with the Gaussian distribution Hi. The histogram in Figure 4
captures this for two CDs. To generalize these results and estimate the Hi dis-
tribution we need a larger sample space. The major problem here is that each
data point needs to come from a diﬀerent CD. Therefore, to obtain a histogram
which clearly depicts a Gaussian we would need to test on the order of 500 CDs.
This was not possible as each CD required substantial time, computing power
and storage space in order to produce ﬁnal data points. However, we were able
to carry out this experiment for about 100 CDs. Each CD was read about 16
times to reduce the noise. Finally, we extracted the lengths of 500 locations for
each of the CDs. Figure 5 depicts the histogram over 100 CDs for a randomly
chosen location out of the 500 extracted locations. The histogram in Figure 5
has a mean of about 940 nm. Overall locations, Σ had a mean of 21 nm (with
an average standard deviation of 1.8 nm on Σ). The histogram in Figure 5 looks
similar to a Gaussian distribution generated from 100 data points. However, it
would be interesting to get a conﬁrmation that with more data points this his-
togram would actually yield a Gaussian. To do so, we normalized the lengths
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Fig. 5. Histograms of reads coming from
the same location on 100 identical CDs
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Fig. 6. Histograms of reads coming from
500 locations on 100 identical CDs
of each location by subtracting the average length for that particular location.
Since the distribution for each location had roughly the same Σ the normal-
ization process eﬀectively made all these distributions identical with a mean of
0 and a standard deviation of Σ. We then collected all these data points (on
the order of 50,000 points) and plotted the corresponding histogram. This is
shown in Figure 6. The histogram of Figure 6 strongly supports our thesis of
normally distributed location lengths across diﬀerent CDs. One might observe
a slight imbalance on the positive side of the Gaussian. This behavior seems to
be a result of the DC oﬀset observed while reading some of the CDs. Fortu-
nately, this will not pose a problem for our ﬁngerprinting technique as we will
be normalizing each batch of data to have a mean of zero, thus removing any
DC components. We ﬁnish this section by showing the histogram in Figure 7.
The main purpose of this histogram is to conﬁrm that what we are studying is
in fact the length of data locations written on the CD. We elaborated earlier
that on a CD data is stored in discrete lengths ranging from about 900 nm to
about 3300 nm taking 9 steps in increments of about 300 nm. We build the
histogram in Figure 7 using the data collected from 500 locations over the 100
CDs without normalizing each location’s length to zero. In Figure 8 we show
a similar histogram with data extracted by processing images coming from a
scanning electron microscope.
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Fig. 7. Histogram of location lengths us-
ing the electrical signal
Fig. 8. Histogram of location areas using
electron microscope images
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4 CD Fingerprinting
There are many challenges in deriving a robust and secure ﬁngerprint. One
important issue is the reading noise. Similar to a human ﬁngerprint, we saw in
the previous section that the readings used to extract the CD ﬁngerprint are
inherently noisy. The extraction of a deterministic and secure ﬁngerprint from
noisy data has been previously studied in the literature [15,14,10]. Most relevant
to our work is the fuzzy extractor technique proposed by Dodis et al. in [10]. For
the remainder of this section we will present a quick review of the fuzzy extractor
technique and then discuss how this technique can be modiﬁed and applied to
the CD setting. Moreover, we will discuss the experimental results and present
various bounds needed to achieve high levels of security.
4.1 Fuzzy Extractors
Loosely speaking a fuzzy extractor is a technique to extract an almost uniform
random string from a given input such that it is possible to reproduce the same
output string from a noisy version of the input. In [10] the authors show how a
fuzzy extractor can be built using an error correcting code along with a universal
hashing function. Their construction requires that the output of the ﬁngerprint
(the biometric data in their language) be represented as an element of Fn for
some ﬁeld F and an integer n which represents the size of the ﬁngerprint. More-
over, it is naturally assumed that the noise experienced by the ﬁngerprint is
upper bounded by a constant distance from the original ﬁngerprint in order to
guarantee identical reproduction of the extracted key. We start by quoting the
following theorem introduced in [10], and then give the speciﬁc construction
which the theorem describes.
Theorem 1. ([10]) Given any [n, k, 2t+1]F code C and any m, , there exists an
average-case (M,m, , t, )-fuzzy extractor, where  = m+kf−nf−2 log(1 )+2.
The generation algorithm GEN and the recovery algorithm REP are eﬃcient if
C has eﬃcient encoding and decoding.
We explain the parameters in the theorem by outlining an actual construction.
This construction is proposed in [10] and further explained in [12]. As stated in
the theorem, C is an error correcting code over the ﬁeld F , where f = log(|F|).3
For the construction we will also need a family of universal hashing functions
H.4 The generation algorithm GEN takes the ﬁngerprint x ∈ Fn as input and
outputs the triplet (k, w, v). Here, x is drawn from some distribution X over Fn
which has min-entropy m. Note that in our context the parameter m captures the
entropy provided by the CD variability. GEN starts by computing w = x+c for a
randomly chosen code word c ∈ C and then computes the key k = hv(x) ∈ {0, 1}
for some string v chosen uniformly at random such that hv ∈ H. The recovery al-
gorithm REP takes in the helper data (w, v) along with x′, a noisy version of the
3 Note that all logarithms in this paper are with respect to base 2.
4 For details on universal hashing the reader is referred to [9].
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ﬁngerprint x, and returns the key k. REP starts by computing c′ = w−x′ which is
a noisy version of c. If the Hamming distance between x and x′ is less than t then
so will the Hamming distance between c and c′. Therefore, using the error cor-
recting code C, REP can reproduce c from c′. Next, REP computes x = w−c and
consequently compute k = hv(x) which will conclude the recovery algorithm. All
that remains to be deﬁned is the parameter  which captures the security of the
fuzzy extractor. Speciﬁcally, if the conditional min-entropy5 H∞(X |I) (meaning
X conditioned on I)6 is larger than m then SD((k, (w, v), I), (U, (w, v), I) ≤ )
where SD(A,B)= 12
∑
v |Pr(A = v) − Pr(B = v)| is the statistical distance
between two probability distributions A and B. Finally, U is the uniform dis-
tribution over {0, 1} and I is any auxiliary random variable.
With this construction we will have a clear way to build a fuzzy extractor.
However, the key size  and the security parameter  will both depend on m
and the code used. Moreover, the code will depend on the noise rate in the
ﬁngerprint. We ﬁnish this section by relating the min-entropy and the error rate
of the ﬁngerprint. Recall, that x is required to have a min-entropy of m and
at the same time using the above construction x will have n symbols from F .
To merge these two requirements we deﬁne the average min-entropy in every
symbol δ = m/n. We also deﬁne ν to be the noise rate in the ﬁngerprint x and
F = |F|. With these deﬁnitions we can now prove the following simple bound
relating the noise rate and the min-entropy rate δ/f .
Proposition 1. For the fuzzy extractor construction of Theorem 1, and for any
meaningful security parameters of  < 1 and  > 2 we have HF (ν) < δf . Where
HF is the F -ary entropy function.
Proof. From Theorem 1 we now that  = m + kf − nf − 2 log(1 ) + 2. Let
A =  + 2 log(1 ) − 2 = m + kf − nf . From the conditions above we now that
A > 0 and therefore m+kf−nf > 0. Let R = k/n which yields (δ+Rf−f)n > 0
and therefore R > 1−δ/f . Using the sphere packing bound where R ≤ 1−HF (ν)
we immediately get HF (ν) < δf .
As it is quite diﬃcult to calculate the min-entropy for a physical source we will
estimate this quantity over the symbols of x. The bound given above will give us
an idea whether the min-entropy in the symbols of x will be suﬃcient to handle
the measured noise rate. Next we shift our attention to the ﬁngerprint extraction
technique. Note here that we still did not address how the data extracted from
the CDs will be transformed into the ﬁngerprint x.
4.2 Fingerprint Extraction
In Section 3 we described how the empirical data suggests that every CD has
unique location lengths. These location lengths as can be seen from Figure 7
5 The deﬁnition of min entropy is H∞(A) = − log(maxaPr[A = a]).
6 Typically we use the | operator to mean concatenation. This will be the only part
of the paper where it will have a diﬀerent meaning.
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Fig. 9. Length variation over 500 loca-
tions from CD1 with the bottom trace
taken 3 months after the top two traces
Fig. 10. Length variation over 500 loca-
tions from CD2 with the bottom trace
taken 3 months after the top two traces
will have diﬀerent values depending on the encoded information. Moreover, we
discussed earlier that the raw data measured from the electrical signal will some-
times have diﬀerent DC oﬀsets. Therefore, it is important to process the data
before the diﬀerent locations can be combined together in order to produce the
ﬁnal ﬁngerprint x. The ﬁrst step in processing the data coming from every lo-
cation on every CD is to remove the signal noise. To achieve this, the length
of every location on a CD is averaged over a number of readings. Since we are
assuming Gaussian noise, the noise level σ will scale to σ/
√
a where a is the
number of readings used for averaging. Next, we normalize the data using the
ideal average of each location. As the ideal location lengths are discretized it
becomes easy to ﬁnd the ideal length for every location and subtract it from
the measured lengths. This will guarantee that all location lengths have similar
distributions as we saw in Figure 6. Finally, to remove the DC component we
need a second normalizing step. We subtract the mean of the reading coming
from diﬀerent locations of the same CD. Figures 9 and 10 show the variation
in the length of 500 locations for two identical CDs after being averaged and
normalized. Each ﬁgure contains three traces with an added horizontal shift to
set the traces apart. The top two traces in each ﬁgure are obtained from readings
taken at diﬀerent times using one CD reader. The bottom trace in each ﬁgure
was obtained three months after the ﬁrst two traces using a second CD reader
with a diﬀerent brand and model. The vertical axis represents the variation in
nanometers from the ideal length of that location. These ﬁgures clearly support
the idea of identical CDs having diﬀerent ﬁngerprints which are reproducible
from diﬀerent readers. We still need to outline a technique to extract a ﬁnal
ﬁngerprint. Even after the previous averaging and normalization steps we will
still have errors in the length readings. Although we will be using a fuzzy ex-
tractor to correct the errors, the biggest challenge towards achieving an eﬃcient
extraction technique will be the nature of these errors. The noise is Gaussian
over the real values of the lengths. This means that even when the data is dis-
cretized the error will manifest itself more as a shift error from the ideal length
rather than a bit ﬂip error. Unfortunately, the Hamming metric does not nat-
urally accommodate for this kind of error. Moreover, if we assume that every
location length of the CD will be a symbol in the extracted ﬁngerprint, then
the error rate would be very high as it is very diﬃcult to get the same exact
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Table 1. Formulation of the threshold scheme for CD ﬁngerprint extraction
Threshold Scheme: (GEN,REP) parameterized by M,m, , t, , l, C,H, τ = 2s
GEN: (k,w, v) ← GEN(CDj)
1. Obtain (a) samples for the length of each of the n locations on CDj.
2. Generate z = zn . . . z1:
a. Average the lengths over a samples,
b. Subtract the ideal mean from the averaged reads,
c. Normalize the sequence to have a zero mean and set that to z.
3. Find u such that −2u−1 ≤ zi ≤ 2u−1 − 1 for all i, and shift zi to 0 ≤ zi ≤ 2u − 1.
4. Shift the binary representation of zi left by l bits, round to an integer and set to zˆi.
5. Form z2,i, the lowest s + 1 bits of zˆi, and xi = z1,i, the remaining bits of zˆi.
6. Set x = xn . . . x1 to be the ﬁngerprint template.
7. Choose a random code word c ∈ C, such that c = cn . . . c1.
8. Compute wi = (xi|z2,i) + (c|τ ) and form w = wn . . . w1.
9. Randomly choose v to compute k = hv(x) where hv ∈ H, and output (k,w, v).
REP: k ← REP(CDj, w, v)
1. Generate z′ = z′n . . . z
′
1 as zˆ = zˆn . . . zˆ1 was generated in Steps 1 through 4 of GEN.
2. Set c′i to be the highest u + l − s− 1 bits of wi − z′i.
3. Use C to correct c′ = c′n . . . c′1 to c = cn . . . c1.
4. Compute xi = wi − ci.
5. Form x = xn . . . x1 and return k = hv(x).
length for the CD locations. A more natural distance metric in this situation
would be the Lee metric [16]. However, this will require ﬁnding long codes that
have good decoding performance under the Lee metric. To solve this problem we
propose a threshold scheme which uses the Hamming distance while allowing a
higher noise tolerance level. The threshold scheme also works naturally with the
fuzzy extractor construction of Theorem 1. Table 1 shows a formulation of the
threshold scheme applied to the CD setting. The threshold τ solves the error cor-
recting problem with respect to the Lee distance. In particular, τ helps control
the error rate which arises when treating the real values as symbols over some
ﬁeld. Without a threshold scheme (τ = 0), the error rate will be very high. On
the other hand, if τ grows too large then the error rate will be low. However, the
Hamming distance between the extracted ﬁngerprint originating from diﬀerent
CDs will decrease thus decreasing distinguishability between CDs. An important
aspect about the threshold scheme is that it is very simple to compute and does
not require previous knowledge of the distribution average.
4.3 Entropy Estimation and 128-Bit Security
The previous sections dealt with the theoretical aspects of extracting the CD
ﬁngerprint. In this section we take more of an experimental approach where we
are interested in computing actual parameters. The most important parameters
that we need to estimate are the entropy of the source (the CD variability) and
the noise level. With these two parameters the rest of the parameters can be
determined. The ﬁrst and hardest task here will be to decide the amount of
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entropy generated by the source. In [12] and [13] the authors use a universal
source coding algorithm in order to estimate the secrecy rate. In particular it
was proposed to use the Context-Tree Weighting Method (CTW) [19]. What is
quite useful about the CTW algorithm is that in [18] it was shown that for any
binary stationary and ergodic source X , the compression rate achieved by CTW
is upper bounded by the min-entropy H∞(X) as the length of the input sequence
approaches inﬁnity. This is a good indication about the entropy produced by the
source provided enough bits are fed to the algorithm. To apply this algorithm to
our setting we start by using the data coming from the 100 CDs. On each CD we
collected data from 500 locations and processed the data with a threshold value
of τ = 22. The ﬁnal data came out to be in the range [0, 25 − 1] and we did not
use any fractional bits so l = 0. With these parameters the size of the symbols
was f = 2. This means that every CD produced 1000 bits. The data was fed into
the CTW algorithm which resulted in a compression rate of about 0.83 bits of
entropy per extracted bit. Recall here that these samples were not averaged over
multiple reads. Therefore the error rate is quite high. When we averaged over
16 samples the combined entropy rate became 0.71. This is expected since the
noise will add to the entropy. In order to get a more precise estimate for the min
entropy we decided to average over 225 reads. With this many reads we had to
restrict our sample to only 14 CDs as the amount of data quickly becomes large.
With the new sample the compression rate of the CTW algorithm was about
0.675 which seemed to be a good estimate of our min-entropy. For this sample,
the average error rate is Pe = 0.08. On the other hand the collision probability
Pc, the probability of extracting similar bits between two diﬀerent CDs, is about
0.46.
Proposition 1 suggests that for a noise rate of 0.08 and f = 2 the entropy
of the source should be at least 0.40 which translates to δ = 0.8 < 1.35, and
therefore we conclude that we have enough entropy in our source. However, with
this level of entropy we are placing stringent conditions on R, i.e. the rate of
the error correcting code.7 To relax the restriction on the code rate we took a
closer look at our source bits. Ideally the two bits would have the same entropy.
However, looking at Figure 9 and 10 and multiple similar ﬁgures we clearly see
that there is a degree of dependency between the adjacent locations. There is a
low probability of a sharp change in the length variability from one location to
its neighbor. With this observation we would suspect that the most signiﬁcant
bit will have less entropy as it is less likely to change across adjacent locations.
To verify this observation, we applied the CTW algorithm to each of the two
extracted bits separately. For the most signiﬁcant bit, the entropy for the cases
of no averaging, averaging over 16 reads, and averaging over 225 reads was 1, 0.9
and 0.6-bits of entropy, respectively. When we repeated this process for the least
signiﬁcant bit we obtained 1, 1 and 0.98-bits of entropy, respectively. Clearly, we
have more entropy in the least signiﬁcant bit. It seems reasonable to only use
the least signiﬁcant bit to form the ﬁngerprint and the ﬁnal key. This would
7 Recall from the prof of Proposition 1 that R ≥ A/nf + (1− δ/f) for a security level
of at least A =  + 2 − 2.
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eﬀectively increase the entropy of our source while very slightly aﬀecting the
error rate and the collision rate. For this least signiﬁcant bit scheme we obtained
Pe = 0.08 and Pc = 0.46.
We now have Pe = 0.08, δ = 0.98 and f = 1. With these parameters we
can build a fuzzy extractor which can extract secure keys from CD ﬁngerprints.
For a 128-bit key we set  = 128. Similarly, to achieve a fuzzy extractor output
which reveals very little information about the ﬁngerprint we set  = 64. Using
the equation of Theorem 1 we require that the error correcting code in the fuzzy
extractor should satisfy k ≥ 190 + 0.02n. Note that although Pe = 0.08, this is
the expected error rate. For a practical scheme we require the fuzzy extractor
to correct around a 0.17 error rate. These parameters can now be satisﬁed using
a binary BCH code of [255, 45, 88]. More speciﬁcally, we deﬁne a code word
containing 7 code words of this BCH code, which will make n = 1785. With
this construction the failure probability8 Pfail will be on the order of 10−6. Note
here that treating the 7 code words separately to generate separate parts of
the key would signiﬁcantly decrease  but will decrease the failure probability.
Therefore, in our failure probability we treat the 7 code words as a single entity.
As we noted earlier, our data suﬀers from higher error rates due to the external
connections which we used. With an on-chip process we can expect the error
rate to drop signiﬁcantly.
5 Robustness of the Fingerprint
A CD ﬁngerprint can be used to tie software licenses to individual CDs where
the software is stored. Under this use scenario it becomes important to address
the robustness of the ﬁngerprint. In all our experiments the data collected came
from locations in the same sector of the CD. In a real application readings would
typically be collected from diﬀerent sectors. Thus ensuring that a scratch or any
physical damage to a speciﬁc location will not render the CD ﬁngerprint useless.
Another important concern regarding the robustness of the ﬁngerprint is that
of aging. Although no quantitative estimate of ﬁngerprint durability can be given
within the scope of this work, mechanisms related to viscoelastic relaxation in
optical disc patterns need to be discussed brieﬂy. Optical discs are printed on
polymeric substrates, which have glass transition temperatures typically above
150 oC. The viscosity of such materials are temperature dependent and gov-
erned by an Arrhenius type exponential temperature dependence, described by
an activation energy deﬁned by the glass transition temperature. In its simplest
form, the Arrhenius model assumes that the rate of change is proportional to
e
−Ea
kT where Ea is the activation energy, k is the Boltzmann constant (an in-
variant physical parameter) and T is the absolute temperature (temperature
in degrees Kelvin). Even at lower temperatures (natural operating and storage
temperature range of the optical disc), viscosity of the polymer remains ﬁnite.
During the molding process, most of the internal stresses are relieved upon cool-
ing, resulting in ﬂuctuations in the nanoscale structure of the bit patterns. The
8 Here, Pfail = 1−
(
1−∑t=43i=0
(
n
i
)
P ie(1− Pe)n−i
)7
.
CDs Have Fingerprints Too 361
pressed discs have a thin metal coating, which is typically coated on to the poly-
mer disc by evaporation or sputter coating, that results in the increase of the
surface temperature by up to 50 oC. This process is also likely to be a source of
local thermoelastic stress buildup which relaxes over the lifetime of the CD. In a
ﬁrst order approximation, the disc material can be thought of as a Kelvin-Voigt
material, and creep relaxation can be approximated by a single time-constant
exponential behavior. In such a case, most of the viscoelastic relaxation will oc-
cur at the early stages of disc production, and latter time scales will have less of
an eﬀect. It may be speculated that the ﬁngerprints due to length ﬂuctuations
of 25 nm upon 300 nm characteristic bit length will persist within at least 10%
of the CD lifetime, which is predicted to be 217 years at 25 oC and 40% relative
humidity conditions. This gives an estimated 20 year lifetime for the ﬁngerprint
[20]. Due to the exponential dependence of the relaxation on time, by recording
the signature on a slightly aged optical disc (months old), the persistance of the
signature can be increased.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we showed how to generate unique ﬁngerprints for any CD. The
proposed technique works for pressed and burned CDs, and in theory can be
used for other optical storage devices. We tested the proposed technique using
100 identical CDs and characterized the variability across the studied CDs. We
also gave speciﬁc parameters and showed how to extract a 128-bit cryptographic
keys. This work opens a new door of research in the area of CD IP-protection.
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